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STATE LIABILITY AND INFRINGEMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE  








1.   THE FACTS IN KÖBLER.1  
 
Gerhard Köbler had been employed as an ordinary university professor in 
Innsbruck (Austria) since 1 March 1986. On his appointment, he was awarded the 
salary of an ordinary university professor – grade 10 – increased by the normal 
length-of-service increment. Ten years later, he applied for the special length-of-
service increment for university professors under Article 50a of the Gehaltsgesetz 
(Salaries Act) of 1956. He claimed that, although he had not completed fifteen 
years’ service as a professor at an Austrian university, he had completed the 
requisite length of service if the duration of his service at universities in other 
Member States of the European Community was taken into account. He claimed 
that the condition of the completion of fifteen years’ service solely in Austrian 
universities, with no account being taken of periods of service in universities in 
other Member States, constituted unjustified indirect discrimination under 
Community law. Köbler then instituted proceedings before the Verwaltungs-
gerichtshof (administrative court), which referred the matter to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling. In the meantime, the Court of Justice had 
delivered its judgment in Schöning-Kougebetopoulou.2 The Court of Justice asked 
the Verwaltungsgerichtshof whether – in the light of this judgment – it deemed it 
necessary to maintain its request for a preliminary ruling. On 24 June 1998, the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof withdrew its request for a preliminary ruling and 
dismissed Köbler’s application, on the grounds that the special length-of-service 
increment was a loyalty bonus that objectively justified a derogation from the 
Community law provisions on freedom of movement for workers. Köbler refused 
to give up and brought an action for damages against the Republic of Austria. In 
                                                                                                                                               
∗  Prof. Jans (1956) teaches EU law at the University of Amsterdam and public law at the 
University of Groningen. 
1  Case C-224/01 Köbler, judgment of 30 September 2003. 
 
The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration – Liber Amicorum Alfred E. Kellermann 
© 2004, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, and the authors 
2  Case C-15/96 Schöning-Kougebetopoulou [1998] ECR I-47. 
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his view, the judgment of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof infringed directly applica-
ble provisions of Community law.  
 
 
2. THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL ACTS 
 
The first question the Court had to answer was one of principle. Can the State be 
held liable for judicial mistakes? The Court observed that it had already held in 
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame.3 that the principle of State liability holds 
good in any case in which a Member State breaches Community law, whatever 
the organ of the State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach. It 
then pointed out the essential role played by the judiciary in protecting the rights 
individuals derive from Community rules, and that the full effectiveness of those 
rules would be called into question if individuals were precluded from being able 
to obtain reparation in the event of errors by the judiciary. The Court particularly 
stressed the crucial role played by a court adjudicating at last instance, as this is 
by definition the last judicial body before which individuals may assert the rights 
conferred on them by Community law. Since an infringement of these rights by 
the final decision of such a court cannot normally be corrected, individuals cannot 
be deprived of the possibility of rendering the State liable in order to obtain legal 
protection of their rights. The Court concluded:  
 
‘Consequently, it follows from the requirements inherent in the protection of the 
rights of individuals relying on Community law that they must have the possibility 
of obtaining redress in the national courts for the damage caused by the infringe-
ment of those rights owing to a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance (see 
in that connection Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 
35).’ (para. 36) 
 
It is striking that the Court went on to consider the main objections Member 
States had raised against the principle of State liability in respect of these kinds of 
judicial decisions only after it had stated its position on this matter of principle. In 
the first place, the arguments put forward were based on the principle of legal 
certainty and, more specifically, the principle of res judicata. While acknowledg-
ing the importance of the principle of res judicata,4 the Court dismissed this 
argument: 
                                                                                                                                               
3  Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, 
para. 32. 
4  See also the judgment in Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz, 13 January 2004, para. 24. 
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‘[I]t should be borne in mind that recognition of the principle of State liability for a 
decision of a court adjudicating at last instance does not in itself have the conse-
quence of calling in question that decision as res judicata. Proceedings seeking to 
render the State liable do not have the same purpose and do not necessarily involve 
the same parties as the proceedings resulting in the decision which has acquired the 
status of res judicata. The applicant in an action to establish the liability of the 
State will, if successful, secure an order against it for reparation of the damage 
incurred but not necessarily a declaration invalidating the status of res judicata of 
the judicial decision which was responsible for the damage. In any event, the prin-
ciple of State liability inherent in the Community legal order requires such 
reparation, but not revision of the judicial decision which was responsible for the 
damage.’ (para. 39) 
 
Nor did arguments based on the independence and authority of the judiciary fare 
any better. As regards the independence of the judiciary, the Court observed that 
the principle of liability in question concerned not the personal liability of the 
judge but that of the State:  
 
‘The possibility that under certain conditions the State may be rendered liable for 
judicial decisions contrary to Community law does not appear to entail any particu-
lar risk that the independence of a court adjudicating at last instance will be called 
in question.’ (para. 42) 
 
And it was clearly little impressed by the argument based on the risk of a diminu-
tion of judicial authority: ‘[T]he existence of a right of action that affords, under 
certain conditions, reparation of the injurious effects of an erroneous judicial 
decision could also be regarded as enhancing the quality of a legal system and 
thus in the long run the authority of the judiciary.’ (para. 43) 
Finally, the Court considered the argument that it was difficult in many legal 
systems to designate a court competent to determine such disputes. It observed 
that application of the principle of State liability could not be compromised by the 
absence of a competent court. Referring to its well-known judgments in Rewe and 
Comet, the Court observed in paragraph 46 that: ‘it is for the internal legal order 
of each Member State to designate the competent courts and lay down the 
detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the 
rights which individuals derive from Community law.’ It went on to state:  
 
‘Subject to the reservation that it is for the Member States to ensure in each case 
that those rights are effectively protected, it is not for the Court to become in-
volved in resolving questions of jurisdiction to which the classification of certain 
legal situations based on Community law may give rise in the national judicial 
system.’ (para. 47) 
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The Court concluded, in summary,  
 
‘that the principle according to which the Member States are liable to afford repa-
ration of damage caused to individuals as a result of infringements of Community 
law for which they are responsible is also applicable where the alleged infringe-
ment stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance. It is for the 
legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to adjudicate 
on disputes relating to such reparation.’ (para. 50) 
 
 
3.   THE CONDITIONS GOVERNING STATE LIABILITY 
 
The Court then discussed the conditions governing State liability. In paragraph 
51, it stated the familiar three conditions: ‘the rule of law infringed must be 
intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; 
and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation 
incumbent on the State and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties.’ 
In paragraph 52, it went on to add: ‘State liability for loss or damage caused by a 
decision of a national court adjudicating at last instance which infringes a rule of 
Community law is governed by the same conditions.’ However, as regards the 
requirement of ‘a sufficiently serious breach’, it noted that regard must be had to 
the specific nature of the judicial function and to the legitimate requirements of 
legal certainty: ‘State liability for an infringement of Community law by a 
decision of a national court adjudicating at last instance can be incurred only in 
the exceptional case where the court has manifestly infringed the applicable law.’ 
(para. 53, emphasis added) 
In order to determine whether this condition was satisfied, namely, whether 
the infringement was manifest, the national court must take account of various 
factors, including:  
 
‘the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, whether the infringement 
was intentional, whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the posi-
tion taken, where applicable, by a Community institution and non-compliance by 
the court in question with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary rul-
ing under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC.’ (para. 55)  
 
In any event, the protection thus afforded is a minimum protection and this 
therefore ‘does not mean that the State cannot incur liability under less strict 
conditions on the basis of national law.’ (para. 57) 
Such claims are governed by the ‘ordinary’ rules of national law on liability,  
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‘with the proviso that the conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down 
by the national legislation must not be less favourable than those relating to similar 
domestic claims and must not be so framed as to make it in practice impossible or 
excessively difficult to obtain reparation.’ (para. 58) 
 
In paragraph 59, the Court summarised the above one more time:  
 
‘In the light of all the foregoing, the reply to the first and second questions must be 
that the principle that Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to 
individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is 
also applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court 
adjudicating at last instance where the rule of Community law infringed is intended 
to confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a 
direct causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the 
injured parties. In order to determine whether the infringement is sufficiently seri-
ous when the infringement at issue stems from such a decision, the competent 
national court, taking into account the specific nature of the judicial function, must 
determine whether that infringement is manifest. It is for the legal system of each 




4.   HOW DID IT END? 
 
Although it is normally for the national courts to apply the conditions for liability 
(see Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paras. 55-57), in this case the Court 
felt able to do so itself, as it had all the relevant information at its disposal. As 
regards the requirement that the rule of law infringed must confer rights on 
individuals, the Court held that it could not be disputed that Article 39 EC and 
Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 were intended to confer such rights. By 
doing so, the Court also indicated that the primary basis for State liability in 
respect of judicial errors must be sought in the underlying substantive law rather 
than in the infringement of the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. This important 
point will be considered in more detail below. 
As regards the requirement that the breach be sufficiently serious, the Court 
first described the precise course of the proceedings and then, in paragraphs 117 
and 118, arrived at the conclusion that – in the light of CILFIT.5 – the Verwal-
tungsgerichtshof should have maintained its request for a preliminary ruling. 
Accordingly, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof infringed Community law when it gave 
                                                                                                                                               
5  Case 283/81 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415. 
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its judgment (para. 119). The next step was to examine whether this infringement 
constituted ‘a manifest infringement’ of Community law, having regard to the 
factors indicated in paragraphs 55 and 56. In this case, the Court held that there 
was no question of a manifest infringement. In the first place, the infringement of 
substantive law – Article 39 EC and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 – 
could not in itself be so characterised:  
 
‘Community law does not expressly cover the point whether a measure for reward-
ing an employee’s loyalty to his employer, such as a loyalty bonus, which entails 
an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers, can be justified and thus be in 
conformity with Community law. No reply was to be found to that question in the 
Court’s case-law. Nor, moreover, was that reply obvious.’ (para. 122)  
 
Nor, in the second place, could the infringement of Article 234 EC – the failure 
to maintain the request for a preliminary ruling – be regarded as ‘a sufficiently 
serious breach’:  
 
‘the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had decided to withdraw the request for a preliminary 
ruling, on the view that the reply to the question of Community law to be resolved 
had already been given in the judgment in Schöning-Kougebetopoulou, cited 
above. Thus, it was owing to its incorrect reading of that judgment that the Verwal-
tungsgerichtshof no longer considered it necessary to refer that question of 
interpretation to the Court.’ (para. 123) 
 
In short, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof may have infringed Community law 
when it gave its decision of 24 June 1998, but ‘in the light of the circumstances of 
the case’, there was no reason for the Court to regard this infringement as being 
manifest in nature and thus as sufficiently serious.  
 
 
5.   SOME COMMENTS 
 
5.1   The principle of State liability  
 
The matter has finally been resolved. Francovich.6 liability does indeed apply to 
all organs of the State, including a court adjudicating at last instance. In some 
respects, this decision is not surprising. After Brasserie du Pêcheur it was hardly 
conceivable that the Court would decide that judicial errors could not give rise to 
liability. In this sense, Köbler is fully in line with the Court’s judgment in 
                                                                                                                                               
6  Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci [1991] ECR I-5357. 
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Commission v. Italy,7 where Italy was held to have failed to fulfil its obligations 
under the Treaty because the manner in which Italian courts, ‘including the Corte 
suprema di cassazione’, applied Italian legislation was incompatible with 
Community law. 
 
5.2   The conditions 
 
Nor can the conditions for State liability really be considered surprising. The 
central criterion remains that the breach must be ‘sufficiently serious’. The Court 
does, however, sow some confusion by concluding, after it has pointed out the 
specific nature of the judicial function, that the State can incur liability only 
where the national court has ‘manifestly’ infringed the applicable law. Although 
the ‘judicial function’ is not so special that judicial errors should as such be 
excluded from State liability, regard must be had to the specific nature of this 
function when determining the conditions. The question is whether the Court here 
means anything different from what it means when it employs the usual formula 
for determining whether a breach is sufficiently serious. According to this 
formula, in the first place, a breach is sufficiently serious where ‘a Member State, 
in the exercise of its legislative powers, has manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits on its powers…’, and, secondly, ‘where, at the time when it committed 
the infringement, the Member State in question had only considerably reduced, or 
even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Community law may be sufficient 
to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach’.8 The application of the 
requirement that the breach be ‘manifest’, particularly in connection with Article 
234 EC, is examined in more detail below.  
 
5.3   Primary basis? 
 
In our book on the ‘Europeanisation’ of Dutch administrative law,9 we assert that 
the European dimension of the issue of State liability for wrongful judicial deci-
sions is in fact confined to possible liability for judicial bodies that fail to fulfil their 
obligations under the third paragraph of Article 234. This view will have to be 
revised in the next edition. It is clear from the Court’s decision in Köbler that the 
primary basis for liability is the infringement of the underlying substantive rules. 
This is because, if the key issue was the infringement of the third paragraph of 
Article 234 EC, it would have been logical for the Court to concentrate on how the 
                                                                                                                                               
7  Case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy, judgment of 9 December 2003. 
8  See, for instance, Case C-118/00 Larsy [2001] ECR I-5063, para. 38. 
 
9  J.H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Inleiding tot het Europees 
bestuursrecht, 2nd edn. (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi 2002) p. 402. The authors intend to publish an English 
version of this book in 2005/2006. 
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obligation to refer questions to the Court of Justice protects the rights of injured 
parties when considering whether the rules that had been infringed ‘confer rights on 
individuals’. Instead, in paragraph 103 et seq., the Court discusses whether the 
provisions of Article 39 EC and Article 7(1) of Regulation 1612/68 confer rights on 
individuals. Moreover, in paragraph 117, the Court observes that the Verwaltungs-
gerichtshof ought to have maintained its request for a preliminary ruling. In other 
words, it infringed the third paragraph of Article 234 by withdrawing its request. To 
use the terminology of CILFIT, the condition that there can be ‘no scope for any 
reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved’ 
was not fulfilled. The infringement of the third paragraph of Article 234 in combi-
nation with a wrong application of the underlying substantive law (as was indeed 
the case in Köbler) does not in itself give rise to liability. This is insufficient for the 
Court to regard it as a ‘manifest infringement’. In other words, failure to meet the 
‘absence of reasonable doubt’ criterion in CILFIT is insufficient to make the 
infringement ‘manifest’. This seems to imply a double reasonableness test, and this 
would seem to imply that the Court of Justice allows courts more latitude to make 
errors than other organs of the State. This is only otherwise in cases where a 
national court more or less categorically refuses to apply the existing case law of 
the Court of Justice. In this kind of case, ‘strict’ liability under Francovich applies. 
As far as case law is concerned, this is unlikely to be the most important category of 
cases. There are, fortunately, few examples of decisions by the highest national 
courts where Community law has been ignored.10 
Wattel has pointed out that the combination of Köbler and CILFIT could lead 
to many more references for a preliminary ruling.11 It is therefore worth quoting 
again the words the Court used in CILFIT to indicate when the highest national 
court is relieved of its obligation to refer a matter to the Court of Justice on 
grounds that the matter is obvious: 
 
‘Finally, the correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave 
no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is 
to be resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national 
court or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts 
of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. Only if those conditions are 
satisfied, may the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to 
the Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it.’ 
(CILFIT, para.16) 
                                                                                                                                               
10  But see the case of Dangeville, European Court of Human Rights, 16 April 2002, and Case C-
129/00 Commission v. Italy. 
 
11  P.J. Wattel, ‘Staatsaansprakelijkheid voor EG-rechtelijk onrechtmatige hoogste rechtspraak’, 
134 WPNR (2003) pp. 840-845. 
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If this means what it says, this exception does not amount to much. The condi-
tions are so strict that the national court will not readily conclude that it is not 
required to refer the matter to the Court of Justice. It is therefore quite possible 
that Köbler will lead to considerably more requests for a preliminary ruling ‘just 
to be on the safe side’. This in turn will undoubtedly result in the Court making 
more active and more frequent use of Article 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure: 
 
‘Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a 
question on which the Court has already ruled, where the answer to such a question 
may be clearly deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question 
admits of no reasonable doubt, the Court may, after informing the court or tribunal 
which referred the question to it, hearing any observations submitted by the per-
sons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute and hearing the Advocate General, give 
its decision by reasoned order in which, if appropriate, reference is made to its 
previous judgment or to the relevant case-law.’ 
 
If the Court were to make more use of this article, this could well adversely affect 
the already sensitive relationship between the Court of Justice and the highest 
national courts. It is no secret that national courts are ‘not amused’ when the Court 
gives its decision by reasoned order under Article 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure. 
This is because application of Article 104(3) implies that the court referring the 
matter is unfamiliar with the case law of the Court of Justice. And courts, especially 
the highest courts, do not like to be told this. It seems to me that it is high time a 
national court requested a preliminary ruling on the exact scope of paragraph 3 of 
Article 234 EC and the CILFIT doctrine. In particular, the question should be 
whether CILFIT, in its literal sense, still applies, or whether the criteria need to be 
revised. As far as the Netherlands is concerned, either the Afdeling bestuursrecht 
(Administrative Law Division of the Netherlands Council of State) or the belasting-
kamer van de Hoge Raad (Tax Division of the Netherlands Supreme Court) – both 
of which have in the past been confronted with Article 104(3) decisions – might 
find a cause to refer this matter to the Court of Justice.12 
In principle, only judgments of courts of last resort can give rise to State li-
ability. And, as is clear from the Court’s decision in Lyckeskog,13 in some cases 
an inferior court may also be a court of last resort. In other words, the court must 
be one which is obliged to request a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC. 
This does indeed seem to me to be the correct principle. A person wishing to 
appeal against a decision of an inferior court that has applied Community law 
                                                                                                                                               
12  Joined Cases C-307/00 to C-311/00 Oliehandel Koeweit and Others [2003] ECR I-1821; Case 
C-102/00 Welthgrove [2001] ECR I-5679. 
13  Case C-99/00 Lyckeskog [2002] ECR I-04839. 
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‘wrongly’ must appeal to a higher court, in the same way as where an inferior 
court has applied national law wrongly. The ‘normal’ appeal procedure must first 
be followed, right up to the highest national court, failing which a judicial 
decision becomes res judicata and an administrative decision becomes final.14  
Nor can I subscribe to the wish to allow liability for the conduct of inferior 
courts, at least not where it is framed in such general terms. The restriction to 
courts of last resort implies an ‘exhaustion of local remedies rule’ before the State 
can be held liable. The only exceptions I would consider acceptable would be in 
the cases suggested by Advocate-General Geelhoed.15 Particularly where inferior 
courts consistently interpret and apply certain parts of Community law incor-
rectly, this can discourage litigants from initiating proceedings or going on to 
appeal. This might justify an exception to the rule, allowing the State to be held 
liable for the conduct of inferior courts. 
 
5.4   Procedural consequences in Dutch law 
 
It is impossible to tell what the procedural consequences of this decision will be. 
The Court of Justice disposes of the matter a little too simply in paragraph 58 by 
referring the matter to rules of national law. Under Dutch law, a Köbler action 
would have to be instituted in a civil action against the State. In other words, in 
the Dutch legal order, the Hoge Raad, the highest ordinary court, would ulti-
mately have to decide on judicial errors of the highest administrative courts: the 
Afdeling bestuursrecht, the College van Beroep van het Bedrijfsleven (Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal) and the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Central Appeals 
Tribunal for the public service and social security matters). However you look at 
it, this would give the Hoge Raad the final word on whether administrative courts 
have fulfilled their Community law obligations properly. This would mean that 
Köbler had acquired unexpected constitutional implications.  
Incidentally, Köbler may touch on far greater constitutional sensitivities in 
other Member States. For example, what if claims for State liability were brought 
before ‘ordinary’ courts for errors of constitutional courts such as the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, the Corte constitutionale, the Arbitragehof, and so forth? 
As regards administrative law mistakes, Steyger.16 and Verhey,17 among others, 
note that, in addition to bringing a civil action against the State for a wrongful 
                                                                                                                                               
14  See further J.H. Jans and K.J. de Graaf, ‘Rechtsbescherming - Bevoegdheid = verplichting? 
Enkele opmerkingen over de uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie in de zaak Kühne & Heitz’, 10 NTER 
(2004) pp. 98-102. 
15  See his Opinion in Case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy, para. 63. 
16  E. Steyger, ‘Rechtsbescherming – De gevolgen van de aansprakelijkheid van de Staat voor 
rechterlijke schendingen van EG-recht’, 10 NTER (2004) pp. 18-22. 
17  In his annotation to Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz in JB 2004/42. 
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judicial decision or against the public law body responsible for infringing the 
underlying substantive Community law rule, the injured party can also attempt to 
obtain an independent decision on reparation from the administrative body 
concerned. If that body refuses to issue such a decision, he can then take the 
administrative law route to obtain redress. It can indeed be assumed, on the basis 
of well-known Dutch case law,18 that a written decision of an administrative organ 
on a request for reparation of loss caused within the context of the exercise by 
that organ of a power based on public law – even if that request does not have a 
specific statutory basis – is a public law legal act and thus a besluit (appealable 
decision) within the meaning of Section 1:3 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht 
(General Administrative Law Act). In the light of the decision of the Hoge Raad 
in Groningen/Raatgever,19 it must for the time being be assumed that an injured 
party can choose which route he takes to obtain reparation.  
 
5.5   Köbler combined with Kühne & Heitz 
 
Matters become even more complicated if we combine Köbler with the Court’s 
judgment in Kühne & Heitz. Another avenue open to an injured party is to request 
the administrative body to ‘reconsider’ the decision that caused the loss or 
damage; and under certain circumstances – according to the judgment in Kühne & 
Heitz – it is obliged to reconsider a decision that conflicts with Community law. 
That being the case, the question arises how this fits in with the obligation under 
Brasserie du Pêcheur to limit the extent of loss or damage? In Brasserie du 
Pêcheur, the Court observed that the injured party must show reasonable dili-
gence in limiting the extent of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the 
damage himself. Does this mean that injured parties must now first request the 
administrative body in question to reconsider its earlier decision before bringing 
an action against the State for judicial errors? And if this request is rejected, must 
they then first go through the entire administrative law process before the State 
can be held liable? In my article on the judgment in Kühne & Heitz in NTER,20 I 
argued that this last question should be answered in the negative, because 
otherwise matters would drag on forever. It seems to me that requiring this of an 
injured party goes beyond the bounds of ‘reasonable diligence’. 
The question that remains unanswered is how we should deal, in procedural 
terms, with errors of the Hoge Raad. It is a moot point whether Articles 6 and 13 
ECHR would preclude it from hearing a case in which its own mistake was the 
subject of the dispute. And Steyger rightly notes in her article in NTER that it is 
                                                                                                                                               
18  Van Vlodrop, AB 1997, 229, with note by PvB. 
19  HR 17 December 1999, AB 2000, 89, with note by PvB. 
20  See n. 14 supra. 
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not likely that such a procedure – within the same branch of the judiciary – would 
result in a favourable decision for the injured party.21 
 
 
6.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The above remarks clarify why I do not feel entirely comfortable with the Court’s 
judgment. Apart from raising many new points of law, it disturbs me because: 
 
• there is no empirical evidence that there really is a problem in the way the 
highest national courts apply Community law; 
• the judgment may well increase the number of unnecessary referrals and thus 
prolong preliminary ruling proceedings even more; 
• this will increase the pressure on the Court of Justice to apply Article 104(3) 
of its Rules of Procedure, and this in turn is unlikely to improve the relation-
ship with national courts; and 
• it may well be necessary to make changes in the national law to channel the 
consequences of the judgment. Failing this, a hierarchy will be created in the 
application of Community law where none now exists, and decisions of the 
specialised administrative courts will become subject to review by the Hoge 
Raad. 
 
It is also debatable whether Köbler is consistent with the proportionality princi-
ple. Even assuming there is a problem concerning the application of European 
law by the highest national courts, the solution that has been chosen seems to go 
further than strictly necessary. It should be remembered that even the Köbler 
doctrine will not be sufficient to prevent national courts from making ‘mistakes’ 
when applying Community law. After all, it is the selfsame national court that 
retains the final word. We all know about Alfred Kellermann’s tireless endeav-
ours regarding the training of national judges in European law, but he also 
understood that European law is firmly rooted in national law. So perhaps there is 
something to be said for the Dutch system after all, in which liability for judicial 
acts is only recognised where they infringe fundamental principles of law.22 
                                                                                                                                               
21  See n. 16 supra. 
22  HR 29 April 1994, NJ 1995, 727, with note by EAA. 
 
